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Restoring the Balance Between
Secrecy and Transparency: The
Prosecution of NationaI Security
Leaks Under the Espionage A ct
Christina E. Wells
he game of leaks is an important one in the United States. Most people
acknowledge that the government has compelling reasons to keep some
information secret, especially information related to national security.
Yet it is widely known that government officials routinely leak secrets to the press and
that such leaks "have played an important role in the governance of the United States
since its founding."' Leaks maintain the transparency necessary to keep government
officials accountable to their constituents.
Unwanted leaks to the press have always irritated presidents, but criminal prosecu-
tion of such leaks was relatively rare.2 That situation changed dramatically with the
Obama Administration, which "prosecuted more leakers of classified information
than all previous administrations combined." The Trump Administration has also
signaled that it will aggressively pursue leaks to the press, arguing that the "staggering
number of leaks undermin [es] the ability of our government to protect this country.'
Prosecution of leakers has occurred largely under the Espionage Act of 1917 ("Espionage
Act"), the primary law government officials use to pursue unauthorized disclosures
of national security information.
This increase in Espionage Act prosecutions is quite worrisome. Transparency and
accountability sit in delicate balance with the need for secrecy. Leaks of national
security information to the press are a critical aspect on the accountability side of the
equation. Until recently the situation involving unauthorized leaks to the press was
understood to involve a "d6tente" where the law "ceded to the government broad pow-
ers to keep secrets but afforded news organizations broad freedom to publish secrets
once those secrets were in the hands of journalists, largely irrespective of how those
secrets got there."s Prosecutions of leaks to the press threaten to undermine
This Issue Brief was initially published in October 2017.
1 Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press and National Security
Information, 83 IND. L.J. 233, 249 (2008).
2 David Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful
Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512, 534-36 (2013).
3 Heidi Kitrosser, Leak Prosecutions and the First Amendment: New Developments and a Closer
Look at the Feasibility of Protecting Leakers, 56 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 1221, 1225 (2015).
4 Julia Edwards Ainsley, Trump Administration Goes on Attack Against Leakers, Journalists,
REUTERS (Aug. 4, 2017, 11:24 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-sessions-leaks-
idUSKBN1AK1UR.
s David McCraw & Stephen Gikow, The End to an Unspoken Bargain?: National Security and
Leaks in a Post-Pentagon Papers World, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 473,473 (2013); see also ALEXANDER
M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 80 (1975).
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government accountability by tipping the previous balance decidedly in favor of
secrecy. Unfortunately, the lack of clarity associated with the language and history of
the Espionage Act allows prosecutions of those who leak to the press to occur and
suggests that the tilt toward secrecy will continue unless Congress and the courts
intervene.
This Issue Brief reviews the relationship between secrecy, transparency and account-
ability in the United States, including the role of anonymous leaks. It also examines
the threat that increased Espionage Act prosecutions pose to government account-
ability and discusses why changes to the Espionage Act are necessary to preserve an
appropriate balance between government secrecy and transparency.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SECRECY, TRANSPARENCY
AND LEAKS IN THE UNITED STATES
A. THE BALANCE BETWEEN SECRECY AND
TRANSPARENCY/ACCOUNTABILITY
Secrecy and transparency both play important roles in effective governance.
Although the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly speak to broad governmental pow-
ers regarding secrecy, the Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional basis for
executive branch secrecy in two areas-assertions of executive privilege and classifica-
tion of national security information.' Such secrecy is necessary for effective conduct
of military action, diplomatic relations, and implementation of foreign policy.7
However, the Supreme Court has recognized that the government's secrecy rights are
not absolute. For example, with executive privilege, i.e., the qualified privilege to
withhold confidential communications between the president and his advisors in litiga-
tion, the Court will not accept generalized assertions of harm but instead requires
identification of specific military secrets or other harm before the executive branch
may withhold such communications during the course of a lawsuit.8
The Court's reluctance to grant the president an absolute right to secrecy reflects
the view that democratic forms of government must be transparent and accountable in
order to claim legitimacy.9 As courts recognize, much of the information officials want
to keep secret also often touches on important policy issues even if the information
pertains to national security: "No decisions are more serious than those touching on
peace and war, none are more certain to affect every member of society. Elections turn
on the conduct of foreign affairs and strategies of national defense, and the dangers of
secretive government have been well documented." 0 Yet national security is one of the
hardest areas in which to find a suitable balance between secrecy and transparency.
The president's classification authority illustrates this problem. Executive Order
No. 13,526, issued by President Obama in December 2009, authorizes the president
to restrict access to several categories of information, including information related
6 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,705-08 (1974); Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518,527 (1988).
7 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) ("Secrecy in respect of
information gathered ... may be highly necessary, and the premature disclosure of it productive of harm-
ful results."); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980) ("The [g] overnment has a compelling
interest in protecting both the secrecy of information important to our national security and the appear-
ance of confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence.").
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710-13.
9 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (G. Hunt ed. 1910) ("A popular Government, without
popular information, or means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both.").
10 United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1081 (4th Cir. 1988) (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
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to military plans, foreign government information, intelligence activities, and weapons
of mass destruction. Under the order, the president may restrict access only if "unau-
thorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable or describable
damage to the national security." 12 The order also identifies levels of classification,
such as "top secret," "secret," and "confidential."" These designations define the
danger to national security that each level of classification poses if information is
disclosed and provide important guidance to agency officials regarding who has access
to the material. 14 Finally, the order prohibits classification of information to conceal
illegal behavior, malfeasance, inefficiency, or other embarrassing information."
At first glance, Executive Order 13,526 attempts to balance secrecy and account-
ability. It allows classification of only certain kinds of information, sets standards of
harm that disclosure of information should cause in order to be classified, and admon-
ishes officials not to classify information simply to avoid embarrassment or wrongdo-
ing. Nevertheless, the classification system has been subject to abuse practically from
the beginning of its existence. Executive officials' tendency to wrongly classify (or
overclassify) information is well-documented.1 6 An enormous amount of information
remains secret that should not under the terms of the order itself. Furthermore,
Executive Order 13,526 considers only the danger to national security and ignores any
benefit that disclosure might pose to the public interest. Thus, it allows for one-sided
balancing in favor of secrecy.
Although Congress can enact legislation to require greater access to information,1 7
its efforts in this arena have fallen far short. Congress passed the Freedom of
Information Act ("FOIA") in 1967, which gives access to "any person" seeking docu-
ments held by executive agencies." In passing FOIA, Congress recognized that "[a]
democratic society requires an informed, intelligent electorate, and the intelligence of
the electorate varies as the quantity and quality of its information varies." 9
Unfortunately, FOIA's numerous exemptions undercut Congress's attempt to inform
its constituents. More specifically, FOIA allows agency officials to withhold properly
classified national security information. 20 Because agency officials have enormous
discretion to make withholding decisions under the exemption, over-withholding is a
serious problem. Legal challenges to withholding decisions are expensive. Furthermore,
11 Exec. Order No. 13,526 5 1.4 (2009). Each president can issue an order or update a previous order.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 5 1.2.
14 For example, the term "'top secret' shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure
of which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security that
the original classification authority is able to identify or describe." Id. at 5 1.2(a) (1). In contrast, informa-
tion classified as "secret" need only "cause serious damage to the national security." Id. at 5 1.2(a)(2).
iS Id. at 5 1.7(a).
16 Examining the Costs of Overclassification on Transparency and Security: Hearing Before the
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 114th Cong. - (2016) (Statement of J. William Leonard,
Former Director Information Security Oversight Office), https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/up-
loads/2016/12/Leonard-ISOO-Statement-Overclassification-12-7.pdf; Christina E. Wells, "National
Security" Information and the Freedom of Information Act, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1195, 1198-1205 (2004).
17 Egan, 484 U.S. at 530.
s 5 U.S.C 5 552(a)(3) (2016).
19 H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 2429 (1966).
20 FOIA's national security exemption includes information "specifically authorized under criteria
established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy"
and which is "in fact properly classified." 5 U.S.C. 5 552(b) (1). FOIA contains an additional eight exemp-
tions for material on other topics. See 5 U.S.C. 5 552(b)(2)-(9).
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in disputes over agency withholding decisions under the national security exemption,
judges are often quite deferential to the government even though Congress amended
FOIA in 1974 to allow judges to engage in independent review of the propriety of
classification decisions. 21 Once the government has met its burden of establishing the
applicability of an exemption, courts often defer to government affidavits outlining
the classification level of the information, describing the documents withheld, and the
procedures used to arrive at the decision to classify and withhold. 22
B. LEAKS AND LEAKERS-THE SYMBIOSIS BETWEEN
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND THE PRESS
With formal routes to obtaining government information cumbersome and margin-
ally effective, an informal system of leaks to journalists arose, at least in part, to fill
the gap. In fact, observers note that "leaking classified information occurs so regularly
in Washington that it is often described as a routine method of communication about
government." 23 Many of those leaks contain valuable policy information that informs
public decision-making. Most famously, Daniel Ellsberg leaked the Pentagon Papers
to the New York Times and Washington Post during the Vietnam War. More recently,
highly publicized news stories include leaked information about the National Security
Administration's (NSA) conclusions regarding Russia's attempts to hack election soft-
ware during the 2016 U.S. elections, 24 the CIA's ability to bypass encryption on
smartphones, 25 the NSA's data collection regarding U.S. citizens and allies, 26 the U.S.
government's failed attempt to disrupt Iran's nuclear program, 27 a foiled suicide
bomber attack on a U.S.-bound airline, 28 and the treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib
and Guantanamo Bay. 29 Many of these leaks have had a profound effect on public
opinion and, consequently, on U.S. policy.
The classic conception of those who leak involves an image of a mid- to low-level
government insider who views themselves as a whistleblower, attempting to shed light
on government wrongdoing, or who simply wants to bring something to the public's
21 Congress amended FOIA in response to a Supreme Court decision, EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73
(1973), which held that judges could review only the procedures used in classification decisions and not
the substantive propriety of a particular classification decision. The amendments added the current
language requiring that the exemption apply only to information "properly classified pursuant
to ... Executive Order." 5 U.S.C. 5 553(b)(1)(B).
22 Wells, supra note 16, at 1206-07; see also Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of
Review Standards, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 679, 713 (2002).
23 William E. Lee, Deep Background: Journalists, Sources, and the Perils of Leaking, 57 AM. U. L.
REV. 1453, 1467 (2008).
24 Matthew Cole et al., Top-Secret NSA Report Details Russian Hacking Effort Days Before 2016
Election, THE INTERCEPT, (June 5, 2017, 3:44 PM), https://theintercept.com/2017/06/05/top-secret-nsa-
report-details-russian-hacking-effort-days-before-2016-election/.
2s Vault 7: CIA Hacking Tools Revealed, WIKILEAKS (Mar. 7, 2017), https://wikileaks.org/ciav7pl/.
6 Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, THE
GUARDIAN (June 5,2013,6:05 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/un/06/nsa-phone-records-
verizon-court-order.
2 Michael Isikoff, Ex-CIA Officer Charged With Leak to Reporter, NBC NEWS (Jan. 6, 2011, 4:10
PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/40951509/ns/us-news-security/t/ex-cia-officer-charged-leak-times-
rep orter/#.Wbb -d9VSzcs.
2 Scott Shane & Eric Schmitt, Qaeda Plot to Attack Plane Foiled, U.S. Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES
(May 7,2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/08/world/middleeast/us-says-terrorist-plot-to-attack-
plane-foiled.html.
2 James Risen, GI.s Are Accused of Abusing Iraqi Captives, N.Y TIMES, Apr. 29,2004, at A15; Dana
Priest & Joe Stephens, Pentagon Approved Tougher Interrogations, WASH. POST, May 9, 2004, at Al.
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attention during an important policy debate or other initiative. Certainly, people leak
for such reasons. Chelsea Manning, for example, asked of others "If you saw incred-
ible things, horrible things, things that belonged in the public domain and not in some
server stored in a dark room in Washington, D.C.-what would you do?"o
But this conception of those who leak to the press is incomplete. Many leaks actu-
ally originate at higher levels of government, such as with presidents and high-level
administrative officials. Their motives for leaking to the press vary considerably.
They may range from a desire to gain public support for policy agendas or to float a
trial balloon to determine the public's response to a proposed initiative.32 Some officials
leak information to the press as a means of communicating with other officials or
legislators, or to gain the upper hand in a debate." Some leak as a form of retribution-
i.e., to retaliate against critics or political enemies.3 4
These motives shed light on why historically the executive branch rarely attempted
to prosecute leaks to media outlets. Many leakers attempt to further policy agendas
rather than expose government wrongdoing. Thus, the game of leaks is integral to
governance in the United States. It makes no practical sense to engage in full-throated,
even-handed pursuit of leaks that could put everyone in an administration at risk. 1
However, pursuing only those leaks an administration dislikes-usually from low- to
mid-level leakers-leaves an administration open to claims of retaliatory prosecution
or that it is manipulating the information it wants the public to receive." Finally,
aggressively pursuing leakers puts government officials' relationships with the press
at risk by increasing distrust between administrative officials and the very media actors
upon whom they rely to disseminate their policy agendas." A government that openly
prosecutes press publications is unlikely to find receptive journalists when it needs or
wants to leak information for its own purposes.
In the last decade, however, the Obama and Trump Administrations have increased
prosecutions of leakers and taken increasingly worrying actions against the press.
Most of these prosecutions involved leaks by low- to mid-level employees or officials
who sought to shed light on government programs, rather than by high-level admin-
istrative officials.
3 Anna Mulrine, Bradley Manning Trial: Leakers Julian Assange and Daniel Ellsberg Weigh In,
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (July 26,2013), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2013/0726/
Bradley-Manning-trial-Leakers-Julian-Assange-and-Daniel-Ellsberg-weigh-in. Other leakers may be
less focused on wrongdoing and more focused on simply revealing perceived important information
buried so deeply that FOIA requests would not discover it. David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 257, 259 (2010).
31 Lee, supra note 23, at 1468-70; Pozen, supra note 2, at 529-30.
32 Papandrea, supra note 1, at 251-53; Pozen, supra note 2, at 532.
33 Lee, supra note 23, at 1468-69; Papandrea, supra note 1, at 252-54.
34 Lee, supra note 23, at 1468-69.
35 Id. at 1467-68.
36 Papandrea, supra note 1 at 254; McCraw & Gikow, supra note 5, at 492-94.
37 Pozen, supra note 2, at 530-31 (describing symbiotic relationship between government officials
and press).
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C. RECENT PROSECUTION TRENDS IN THE
OBAMA AND TRUMP ADMINISTRATIONS
Prior to the Obama Administration, there were three prosecutions of individuals
who leaked national security information to the press under the Espionage Act." The
Obama and Trump administrations, however, have pursued at least nine such prosecu-
tions. For example, federal law enforcement officials prosecuted (1) Thomas Drake,
a senior NSA official, for providing classified information regarding alleged NSA
mismanagement to the Baltimore Sun, (2) former CIA officer Jeffrey Sterling for
disclosing classified information about the U.S. government's attempt to sabotage
Iran's nuclear program to New York Times reporter James Risen, (3) Stephen Kim
for disclosing classified information about North Korea's nuclear program to Fox
News reporter James Rosen, and (4) former CIA officer John Kiriakou for disclosing
information about the CIA's detention and interrogation program to a reporter. 9 In
addition, the military instituted court martial proceedings against Private Chelsea
Manning for downloading and delivering to Wikileaks a multitude of classified dip-
lomatic cables and other military information. 40 Federal officials also indicted Edward
Snowden, a former NSA contract employee for downloading and leaking classified
information related to NSA data collection programs to The Guardian (UK) and
Washington Post.41 Recently, Trump Administration officials indicted Reality Winner,
a former contract employee, for leaking a classified NSA document about Russian
attempts to interfere in the 2016 elections. 42
In contrast to their pursuit of leakers, Presidents Obama and Trump have paid lip
service to the need for a free press. President Obama stated that his administration
would not criminally pursue journalists because a free press is "essential for our democ-
racy... Journalists should not be at legal risk for their jobs." 43 Yet, Obama Administration
officials engaged in actions that put a free press at risk, including subpoenaing journal-
ists' phone records and emails, and naming journalists as unindicted co-conspirators
in Espionage Act prosecutions of leakers." Trump's Attorney General, Jeff Sessions,
also acknowledged "the important role that the press has," but stated he was not inclined
to read that freedom broadly, noting that the media's rights were "not unlimited" and
3 Samuel Morison was convicted of violating the Espionage Act for leaking photographs to a defense
publication. United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988). Anthony Russo and Daniel Ellsberg
were prosecuted under the Espionage Act for leaking the Pentagon Papers to the Washington Post and
New York Times but the charges were dismissed. Melville B. Nimmer, National Security Secrets v. Free
Speech: The Issues Left Undecided in the Ellsberg Case, 26 STAN. L. REV. 311, 314 (1974). In 2005, State
Department analyst Lawrence Franklin pled guilty under the Espionage Act to leaking classified infor-
mation about Iran to lobbyists. David Johnston, Former Military Analyst Gets Prison Term for Passing
Information, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2006, at A14.
39 See Stephen P. Mulligan & Jennifer K. Elsea, Criminal Prohibitions ofLeaks and Other Disclosures
of Classified Defense Information, CRS Report (March 7,2017) at 20-23, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/
R41404.pdf. For a discussion of other prosecutions, see id. at 23-25.
40 Id. at 21-22.
41 Id. at 24.
42 Cole, supra note 24.
43 Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National Defense University (May 23,2013), https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university.
44 Leonard Downie, Jr., The Obama Administration and the Press: Leak Investigations and
Surveillance in Post-9/11 America, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Oct. 10, 2013), https://cpj.
org/reports/2013/10/obama-and-the-press-us-leaks-surveillance-post-911.php.
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that "[t]hey cannot place lives at risk with impunity." 45 He implied that the Trump
Administration would curtail an Obama policy against subpoenaing journalists for the
identities of their sources in leak cases. 46 The Trump Administration has also labeled
some publishers of national security information, like Wikileaks, as "hostile intelligence
services" for publishing information that other countries could use to the disadvantage
of the United States. 47 This characterization seems to differ from the Obama
Administration's official statement that Wikileaks stood on the same footing as main-
stream news organizations and journalists. 48
II. THE ESPIONAGE ACT AND ITS INTERPRETATION
A. THE ACT
Several discrete laws exist for punishing unauthorized disclosure of national secu-
rity information. 49 Because of its relative breadth, the Espionage Act is the primary
law on which government officials rely. Although much of the Act targets classic
espionage activities, such as spying,5 0 it does contain provisions that arguably allow
punishment of leakers and publishers of national security information.
Sections 793(d) prohibits persons with lawful possession of information from "will-
fully" communicating, distributing, or attempting to communicate or distribute to
any person not entitled to receive it:"
any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photo-
graph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instru-
ment, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, or
information relating to the national defense which information the
possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the
United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation.5 1
Section 793 (e) uses essentially the same language but punishes those who have "unau-
thorized possession" of the specified government information or documents and who
45 Kevin Johnson, Attorney General JeffSessions Announces Broad Crackdowns on Leaks, Issues
Warnings to the Press, USA TODAY (Aug. 4, 2017, 11:22 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
politics/2017/08/04/jeff-sessions-justice-department-triples-number-leak-investigations/539476001/.
46 Callum Borchers, JeffSessions Might Subpoena Journalists to Reveal Leakers. Mike Pence Once
Fought Against That., WASH. POST. (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/
wp/2017/08/04/jeff-sessions-might-subpoena-journalists-to-reveal-leakers-mike-pence-once-fought-
against-that/?utmterm= .efllece47cf0.
47 Morgan Chalfant, CIA Head: Wikileaks a 'Non-state Hostile Intelligence Service," THE HILL,
(Apr. 13, 2017, 3:44 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/328730-cia-director-wikileaks-a-
non-state-hostile-intelligence-service.
48 Sari Horwitz, Julian Assange Unlikely to Face U.S. Charges Over Publishing Classified Documents,
WASH. POST, (Nov. 25,2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/julian-assange-
unlikely-to-face-us-charges-over-publishing-classified-documents/2013/11/25/dd27decc-55fl-11e3-8304-
caf30787cOa9_story.html?utmterm=.6cee804dl443.
49 Relevant laws include 18 U.S.C. 5 641, which criminalizes knowing theft of government property,
50 U.S.C. 55 3121-26, which punishes disclosing the identity of covert intelligence agents, 18 U.S.C. 5
952, which punishes employees who willfully publish diplomatic code, and 42 U.S.C. 5 2274, which
prohibits disclosing information related to nuclear energy or weapons. For more discussion, see Mulligan
& Elsea, supra note 39, at 7-12.
so Section 794, for example, penalizes transmission of certain information related to national defense
to a foreign government or foreign political or military party. 18 U.S.C. 5 794. Courts have referred to
this section as punishing "classic spying" incidents. Morison, 844 F.2d at 1065.
s1 18U.S.C.5793(d).
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disclose it to persons unauthorized to receive it. 5 2 Sections 793(d) and (e) also contain
clauses prohibiting the willful retention of material listed in each statute. Section 798
prohibits any knowing and willful disclosure of classified information concerning
communications intelligence activities to an unauthorized person or any use of it in
any manner prejudicial to the interests of the U.S. or for the benefit of a foreign
nation.s5 Section 793 (g) punishes any two or more people who conspire to violate any
section of the Espionage Act. 54
With the exception of Section 798, which specifically punishes the disclosure of
"classified information," the provisions of the Espionage Act apply to the disclosure
of information "relating to national defense." Courts interpret this term in light of the
presidential classification system. 5 5 Thus, whether disclosure of information is to a
person "unauthorized to receive it" or is by a person with lawful or unlawful posses-
sion depends on whether the information is classified. The courts also require that the
information that is the subject of the prosecution be "closely held." This requirement
is not synonymous with classified information but rather requires that the government
have secured the information in addition to its being classified-e.g., by not leaking
the information via other avenues.5 6
Reading the Espionage Act in light of this gloss, it is apparent that a "government
insider ... could, theoretically, face Espionage Act prosecution for passing virtually
any classified information to a third party, including a journalist."5 7 Most government
insiders who leak classified information to the press do so intentionally and with
knowledge that they may be violating the law, a state of mind which meets the defini-
tion of "willful" in the statute.5 Since the leaks involve classified information, the
insider arguably knew disclosure had the potential to cause harm. Finally, members
of the public, including the press, are "not entitled to receive" information under the
classification system and thus are prohibited from receiving it under Sections 793(d)
and (e). They would also be an "unauthorized person" under Section 798.
Journalists are similarly at risk under the law. Third parties, such as media actors
who disclose classified information, could qualify as persons with "unauthorized pos-
session" of information under Section 793(e). Publication could qualify as "commu-
nication" of that information to members of the public, who are not authorized to
receive it under the Act. Since publication was likely intentional, the only question
would be whether the media "had reason to believe" the information could be used
to injure the U.S. or aid a foreign nation. Media publication of information concerning
specified communications intelligence activities, such as the NSA's surveillance pro-
grams of U.S. citizens, could also fall under Section 798, which makes "communica-
tion" of such information to an "unauthorized" person illegal.
Application of these provisions to leaks to third parties is not, however, as straight-
forward as it appears. Substantial questions arise regarding the requirement that a
leaker or third-party discloser have "reason to believe" that their disclosure potentially
causes harm to the U.S. or aids a foreign nation. Must the government prove malicious
s2 Id. at § 793(e).
53 Id. at 5 798 (a) (3).
54 id. at § 793 (g).
ss See, e.g., United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988).
s6 Morison, 844 F.2d at 1071; United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 621 (E.D. Va. 2006); id.
at 639-40.
s7 Kitrosser, supra note 3, at 1232.
ss Morison, 844 F.2d at 1071.
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intent or bad faith on the part of leakers or third-party disclosers of information, or
is it enough that they knew their disclosure violated the law and could potentially
harm national security? To what extent must the harm the government fears from
disclosure be concrete or simply possible? The law's language does not clearly answer
these questions.
Additionally, Harold Edgar and Benno Schmidt's exhaustive review of the Espionage
Act's legislative history found that it "may fairly be read as excluding criminal sanc-
tions for well-meaning publication of information no matter what damage to the
national security might ensue and regardless of whether the publisher knew its publi-
cation would be damaging."" Thus, the Act arguably does not apply to third-party
publishers of information at all-at least to the extent they are "well-meaning." And
as discussed below, the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence, which largely
developed after adoption of the Act, also supports this conclusion. Unfortunately,
lower courts recently have tended to side with the government in Espionage Act
prosecutions.
B. THE ESPIONAGE ACT IN THE COURTS
The Supreme Court has not decided a case involving Espionage Act charges against
leakers or publishers. The closest the Court ever came to such a decision involved
Daniel Ellsberg's leak of the Pentagon Papers, a classified history of the U.S. military's
strategy in Vietnam, to the Washington Post and New York Times.o The Court's
decision centered on its concern that a court order barring publication amounted to
an unconstitutional "prior restraint."61 However, some justices intimated that post-
publication criminal sanctions might be appropriate, specifically referencing the
Espionage Act.62 The government did not pursue the newspapers but it did pursue
criminal sanctions against Daniel Ellsberg until a court dismissed the charges due to
government misconduct.63
1. Leakers
The government's decision to pursue Daniel Ellsberg in the Pentagon Papers case
reflects a common theme in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence-the free speech rights
of government employees are limited compared to the rights of other citizens. The Court
recognizes that the government as employer has different interests in regulating the speech
of employees than when regulating the speech of citizens at large. 64 This is especially
true when employees undertake a position of confidence and trust, such as when their
job gives them access to classified information.65 However, even in these cases, the Court
acknowledges the public's interest "in receiving the well-informed views of government
s Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Espionage Statutes and Publication of Defense
Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 937 (1973).
60 New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
61 The Supreme Court defines a prior restraint as an "administrative or judicial order[] forbidding
certain communications... in advance of the time the communications are to occur." Alexander v. United
States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993).
62 Id. at 730 (White, J., concurring) (noting the availability of "specific and appropriate criminal
laws... [that] are of colorable relevance to the circumstances of this case"); see also id. at 743 (Marshall,
J., concurring); id. at 753 (Burger C.J., dissenting); id. at 759 (Blackmun J., dissenting).
63 See Nimmer, supra note 38, at 314.
64 Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
6s Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 507-08 (1980).
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employees." 66 Thus, the government's interests do not necessarily give it carte blanche
to regulate speech; rather, the free speech rights of public employees to comment on
issues of public concern must be balanced against government interests.67
Lower federal courts applying the Espionage Act, however, have refused to find the
First Amendment implicated at all. United States v. Morison involved the prosecution
of an employee who leaked top secret photographs of a Soviet aircraft carrier to the
editor of Jane's Defense Weekly, a defense periodical that published information about
international naval operations. 6' Although the court admitted that the defendant had
not engaged in espionage, it found that the defendant's actions fell within Sections
793(d) and (e) of the Act. The court characterized Morison's decision to take and leak
photographs as "theft" that did not implicate any First Amendment rights.69 More
recently, in Stephen Kim's prosecution for leaking information about North Korea's
nuclear program to Fox News, the court similarly refused to find the First Amendment
applicable. 70 According to the court, "'those who accept positions of trust involving
a duty not to disclose information they lawfully acquire while performing their respon-
sibilities have no First Amendment right to disclose that information." 71
First Amendment issues aside, courts also generally interpret the terms within the
Espionage Act against leakers. For example, courts have rejected a defendant's argu-
ment that the statute requires the government to show defendant's bad faith to harm
the U.S. or aid another country.72 They do so despite the explicit requirements in
Sections 793(d) and (e) that the government show leakers had reason to believe dis-
closure could be used to injure the U.S. or aid a foreign nation. These courts have
occasionally disregarded the "reason to believe" requirement when the defendant has
leaked documents as opposed to orally communicated the information,7 ' but some
seem to dispense with the requirement for any communication. 74 Since most cases
involve leaking documents to journalists, this reading of the Espionage Act effectively
means that the government need only show that the defendant willfully leaked the
material and knew that the disclosure potentially could cause harm.
2. Publishers
The First Amendment rights of publishers are more firmly established than the
rights of leakers, but even here the law is somewhat murky. Although some Justices in
the Pentagon Papers case intimated post-publication criminal sanctions might be appro-
priate, they did not elaborate further. Later Supreme Court cases suggest that prosecu-
tions of the press for publication of national security information may be constitutionally
problematic. These decisions impose a high burden on government officials who
attempt to impose criminal sanctions on the press for publication of truthful and law-
fully acquired confidential information. In Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,
66 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413 (2006).
67 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
61 United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1060-61 (4th Cir. 1988).
69 Id.
70 United States v. Kim, 808 F. Supp. 2d 44, 57 (D.D.C. 2011) (finding that the "Defendant's First
Amendment challenge lacks merit").
71 Kim, 808 E Supp. 2d at 57 (citing Boehner v. McDermott, 484 E3d 573, 579 (D.C. Cir. 2007). See
also United States v. Drake, 818 E Supp. 2d 909,920-22 (D. Md. 2011) (finding First Amendment inapplicable
to Drake's prosecution for taking and retaining classified information he leaked to a reporter).
72 Morison, 844 F.2d at 1068.
73 Drake, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 916-18.
74 Kiriakou, 898 F. Supp. 2d. at 926.
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for example, the Court overturned the conviction of a newspaper publisher for violating
a state law prohibiting the publication of confidential judicial disciplinary pleadings.
According to the Court, the state's legitimate interest in confidentiality could not justify
criminal sanctions for publication.75 Bartnicki v. Vopper, similarly involved a media
defendant convicted for broadcasting an audio tape containing a private conversation.
7 The tape had been obtained by the media in violation of wiretapping laws. The Court
found that the state could not punish a publisher of information of value to public
discourse who had otherwise lawfully acquired the information even though someone
else had broken the law to gain access to the information.77
Unfortunately, these later decisions still leave unanswered questions. Importantly,
they did not involve publication of national security information. Because the Justices
tried to limit the decisions to their facts,78 it is unclear whether courts will apply simi-
larly high standards in Espionage Act prosecutions. After all, the Court has previously
twisted its otherwise protective free speech rules in cases involving national security
concerns.79 Thus, whether a journalist "lawfully acquired" information that she knows
has likely been leaked in violation of the Espionage Act or a government official's
confidentiality obligations could be an open question and could become the centerpiece
of future arguments.o Furthermore, it is unclear whether the courts will apply the
Supreme Court's usually very high intent requirements should the government pursue
Espionage Act prosecutions of publishers."
Only one lower court decision, United States v. Rosen, has discussed whether the
Espionage Act can be applied to non-government insiders who disclose national defense
information. 82 Rosen involved two political lobbyists for AIPAC, an organization that
lobbies Congress and the executive branch on "issues of interest to" Israel." The govern-
ment accused defendants, in their positions as lobbyists, of conspiring to violate Section
793(e) of the Espionage Act by cultivating relationships with federal officials, gaining
access to sensitive information, and disseminating it to persons not entitled to receive
it, such as the media, foreign policy analysts, and officials of other governments.8 4
Since the case did not involve disclosure by government insiders, the court did not
immediately reject the defendant's First Amendment argument. Instead, the court
found that the lobbyists' interests implicated core First Amendment values since gath-
ering information and discussing it "is indispensable to the healthy functioning of a
representative government." This was true even for information the government
attempted to keep secret because the government tends "to withhold reports of
7s Id. at 838.
76 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S 514, 518-21 (2001).
7 Id. at 528.
7 Landmark Comm., 435 U.S. at 840; Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529.
7 Christina Wells, Contextualizing Disclosure's Effects: WikiLeaks, Balancing and the First
Amendment, 97 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 51, 57-58 (2012).
go See Papandrea, supra note 1, at 295.
st See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1941) (noting that government can punish incitement
of unlawful action only if it is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and likely to
incite or produce such action"); see also Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943); Taylor
v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583, 589-90 (1943); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104-05 (1940).
United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 611-14 (E.D. Va. 2006).
83 Id. at 607-08.
84 Id. at 608.
s Id. at 633.
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disquieting developments and to manage news in a fashion most favorable to itself."8 6
Ultimately, however, the court noted that defendants' disclosure of government secrets
"must yield to the government's legitimate efforts to ensure the 'environment of physi-
cal security which a functioning democracy requires.""'
Applying the Espionage Act to defendants, the court construed Section 793(e) as
punishing only intentional disclosure of "closely held" information that a defendant
knew was "'potentially damaging to the United States or ... useful to an enemy of the
United States."' 8 The court allowed the defendants to show they did not know their
disclosures could potentially damage the United States or aid its enemies by arguing
that government officials regularly leaked information to them as a form of "back
channel diplomacy."" However, an appeals court later implied that the lower court's
interpretation "impose [d] an additional burden on the prosecution not mandated" by
Section 793(e). 90 As a result, there is some question as to whether other courts will
follow the lower court in Rosen and require a heightened intent standard.
III. TROUBLING DEVELOPMENTS AND
SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE
A. GOVERNMENT REACTION TO THE RISE OF NONTRADITIONAL MEDIA
The current situation involving interpretations of the Espionage Act is worrisome.
Government insiders who leak to media actors have virtually no defense against pros-
ecution when their leaks contribute to public debate, cause no harm, and when their
motives are unrelated to espionage. Recent government prosecutions seem unrelated
to any potential harm caused and, instead, seem designed to chill all disclosure. For
example, the former Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, J. William
Leonard, stated in hearings before Congress that in the Rosen, Drake and Manning
prosecutions "the government abused the classification system and used it not for its
intended purpose of denying sensitive information to our nation's enemies but rather
to carry out an entirely different agenda." Furthermore, courts rarely allow defen-
dants charged with Espionage Act crimes to raise over-classification or wrongful
classification as a defense. Indeed, wrongly classified documents have been used as the
basis for indictments. 92 Finally, by finding the First Amendment inapplicable to leak-
ers, lower courts ignore the public's interest in receiving information that the Supreme
Court recognizes is part of the balancing involved in other public employee speech
cases. Thus, the government's attempt to chill all unwanted leaks will hurt the public
in addition to stopping leakers. It will also lead to a one-sided and manipulative ver-
sion of events, since high level government officials will still leak information they
want the public to receive.
86 Id.
17 Id. (quoting Morison, 844 F.2d at 1082).
* Id. at 639-40 (quoting Morison, 844 F.2d at 1084).
' United States v. Rosen, Memorandum Opinion, Nov. 2, 2007, at 7-8, http://www.fas.org/sgp/
jud/aipac/memop110207.pdf. Prosecutors later dismissed the case against defendants, complaining that
the court's "knowledge" requirement established an impossibly "high" evidentiary burden. Eli Lake,
Case Against AIPAC Lobbyists Dropped, WASH. TIMES (May 2, 2009), http://www.washingtontimes.
com/news/2009/may/02/fed-drop-charges-against-aipac-staffers/.
90 United States v. Rosen, 557 F.3d 192, 199 n.8 (4th Cir. 2009).
91 See supra note 16 (statement of J. William Leonard), at 3-4.
92 Id.
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Although court decisions suggest that media publishers enjoy greater immunity
from publication, the rights of publishers are also somewhat in doubt. Rosen allowed
prosecution of non-government disclosers of classified information. Furthermore, the
courts involved apparently disagreed as to the appropriate mental state required to
prosecute third-party disclosers. Both developments are concerning in light of the
evolving relationship between leakers and media actors, and the government's increas-
ing hostility toward the press.
The classic leak scenario generally involves a symbiotic relationship between mid-
to high-level officials leaking confidential material to a member of the institutional
press. Websites such as Wikileaks independently and anonymously submit documents
about government and corporate activity. Such websites feel far less pressure to refrain
from publishing information that high level officials want to remain secret because
there is no symbiotic relationship. Thus, their disclosures often include releases of
information that are unsanctioned, generalized, made out of a sense of grievance, or
by people who see themselves as whistleblowers. They are also the type of disclosures
the government most wants to control.
Not surprisingly, government officials have tried to portray these third-party actors
as akin to terrorists who can be prosecuted under the Espionage Act, rather than as
journalists with good intentions." Senator Dianne Feinstein claimed that the founder
of Wikileaks was an "agitator intent on damaging our government." 4 CIA Director
Mike Pompeo called Wikileaks "a non-state hostile intelligence service often abetted
by state actors like Russia."9 s The Senate Intelligence Committee recently reached
the same conclusion in a provision in its annual Intelligence Authorization bill.96
Rosen unquestionably opened the door to prosecution of third-party disclosers of
information who, unlike mainstream journalists, are not in symbiotic relationships
with the government.
It is, however, foolish to think that prosecutions would end with such actors.
Successful characterization of non-traditional media actors as national security threats
could destabilize our understanding about publication of confidential information by
any source. Officials and legislators have intimated that traditional media violates the
Espionage Act for publishing documents leaked to Wikileaks.97 Furthermore, once we
decide that some media actors are less trustworthy than others, nothing stops us from
applying such distinctions to undermine all forms of journalism. In an era where the
current administration labels as "fake news" any leaks that it cannot control,9' such
an approach would be especially troubling. The executive branch's ability to use con-
spiracy charges against journalists or to subpoena journalists for their sources or other
93 Ewan McAskill, Julian Assange Like a Hi-Tech Terrorist, Says Joe Biden, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 19,
2010, 1:20 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2010/dec/19/assange-high-tech-terrorist-biden.
94 Dianne Feinstein, Op-Ed., Prosecute Assange Under the Espionage Act, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7,2010,
at A19.
9s Warren Strobel & Mark Hosenball, CIA Chief Calls Wikileaks a 'Hostile Intelligence Service'
REUTERS (Apr. 13, 2017, 4:11 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cia-wikileaks/cia-chief-calls-
wikileaks-a-hostile-intelligence-service-idUSKBN17F2L8.
96 S. 1761, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017). Section 623 of the bill states "[i]t is the sense of Congress
that WikiLeaks and the senior leadership of WikiLeaks resemble a non-state hostile intelligence service
often abetted by state actors and should be treated as such a service by the United States." Id. at 5 623.
97 McCraw & Gikow, supra note 5, at 491.
9 Daniella Silva, Trump Claims 'Fake News' on Twitter Rant After Return from Abroad, NBC
NEWS, (May 28,2017, 8:27 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/back-home-trump-
goes-twitter-offensive-against-leaks-fake-news-n765641.
156 MOM/10
information, as it has done in the past, is an especially potent weapon with which to
harass those media actors that the administration holds in special disfavor.
B. A WAY FORWARD
Clearly, the d6tente that once existed regarding secrecy and transparency has bro-
ken down. If we are to preserve an appropriate balance that prevents us falling into
pernicious patterns of secrecy, more specific action must be taken. With respect to
government insiders who leak information, Congress (and courts) should act to clarify
the Espionage Act and provide some protection for leakers. This does not mean that
government insiders should be able to leak with impunity, but numerous scholars and
experts have noted that statutory protections can prevent abusive prosecutions.
Amending the Espionage Act to impose a clear and high intent requirement would
protect leakers who have no malicious intent." Congress could also provide affirma-
tive defenses or other possible defense tools to government insiders. For example,
Congress could allow a defendant to show that the information leaked was wrongfully
classified or that they had a reasonable belief that by disclosing classified information
they would expose government malfeasance to public scrutiny.1 00
Courts can similarly protect leakers and preserve security by requiring a showing
of more concrete harm from disclosure. The current requirements defer to the govern-
ment, essentially taking at face value officials' claims that disclosure is "potentially"
damaging to the United States or useful to another nation.101 A requirement that
government officials justify their claims of harm prevents excessive secrecy and focuses
officials on their real concerns, which actually improves decision-making.10 2 Finally,
courts must recognize the very real First Amendment rights of government insiders
even as they leak information.103 Although such rights do not give leakers free rein to
release information, they can inform the extent to which leakers should be afforded
some protections in prosecutions, as opposed to being characterized simply as thieves.
Steps similarly should be taken to protect third-party publishers of information.
Congress should move back toward the Espionage Act's original intent-i.e., that the
Espionage Act was not meant to apply to "well-meaning" publication of information
regardless of the harm it causes. Congress should adopt standards that allow punish-
ment only for intentional publication of classified material that the publisher knows
is likely to cause imminent and grave harm to national security and which does not
9 Mary-Rose Papandrea, National Security Information Disclosures and the Role of Intent, 56
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1381, 1426-41 (2015); Derigan A. Silver, National Security and the Press: The
Government's Ability to Prosecute Journalists for the Possession or Publication of National Security
Information, 13 COMM. L. & POL'Y 447, 483 (2008); Espionage Act and the Legal and Constitutional
Issues Raised by WikiLeaks: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 66-69 (2010)
(comments of Stephen I. Viadeck, Professor of Law), https://fas.org/irp/congress/2010-hr/esp-wl.html.
1oo See Espionage Act Hearings, supra note 99 (Viadeck comments suggesting affirmative defense);
Yochai Benkler, A Public Accountability Defense for National Security Leakers and Whistleblowers, 8
HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 281, 305 (2014) (suggesting public accountability defense).
101 Morison, 844 F.2d at 1071.
102 Christina E. Wells, State Secrets and Executive Accountability, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 625, 629
(2010).
103 Mary-Rose Papandrea, Leaker, Traitor, Whistleblower, Spy: National Security Leaks and the
First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 449, 450-51 (2014); Heidi Kitrosser, Free Speech Aboard the Leaky
Ship of State: Calibrating First Amendment Protections for Leakers of Classified Information, 6 J. NAT'L
SEC. L. & POL'Y 409, 409-10 (2013).
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contribute to public debate. 104 Defenses regarding wrongful classification of informa-
tion should be available. If prosecutions of third-party actors occur without such
amendments to the Espionage Act, courts should play an active role in ensuring that
First Amendment principles requiring intent to cause imminent harm are superimposed
on the current Act.
As importantly, Congress should amend the Espionage Act to make clear that its
inchoate liability provisions, especially provisions providing for conspiracy liability
such as Section 7 93(g), do not apply to any third-party publishers who publish or
disclose information in accordance with the above standards. 0 s These actors should
not be at risk simply because they have received information (even if knowingly) from
another person who may have violated the law. Receipt of this type of confidential
information is the core of a journalist's work. Bringing conspiracy charges for publish-
ing classified information will choke the flow of information altogether. It will force
third-party disclosers to take significant steps to avoid receiving classified information.
In addition, failure to do so could subject them to subpoenas and other investigations
as law enforcement officials attempt to determine their sources. The institution of
journalism as an independent investigative check on government would be completely
undermined as a result.
CONCLUSION
For decades, there existed a shared understanding about the role of leaks in the
balance between secrecy and transparency. Conventional wisdom held that the gov-
ernment had broad power to keep national security information secret, but the press
also had broad authority to publish that information once received. Furthermore, those
who leaked were rarely pursued under criminal laws. This understanding, however,
did not result from clearly stated rules of law. Rather, it resulted from pragmatic con-
cerns that constrained the government's actions, combined with assumptions about
the meaning of complex and ambiguous laws governing the release of national security
information. Our shared understanding has now broken down. As the government
increasingly pursues prosecutions of those who leak national security information to
the press, it is time to clarify the law so that the pre-existing balance between secrecy
and transparency does not tip too far toward secrecy.
104 See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Government Secrecy vs. Freedom of the Press, 1 HARV. L. & POL'Y
REV. 185, 213 (2006); Papandrea, supra note 1, at 297-303.
10s Stephen I. Viadeck, Inchoate Liability and the Espionage Act: The Statutory Framework and the
Freedom of the Press, 1 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 219, 229-30 (2006); Papandrea, supra note 1, at 303-04.
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